The South Pole Fifty Years After by Sullivan, Walter
Courtesy  Scott  Polar  Research  Institute 
Scott and his companions at Amundsen’s tent at the South Pole. 
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Great God! this  is an awful place and terrible 
enough for us to  have laboured to it without 
the reward of priority . . . . 
T HAT cry of anguish  from the  diary of Robert  Falcon  Scott  rings  loudly in  our memories this  anniversary  year,  for it was 50 years ago last  Jan- 
uary  that  he  and his four companions found that  the Norwegians had  beaten 
them to  the  South Pole. 
The intervening half-century has been one of breathless change. We 
are separated  from  the  “race”  to  the  Pole  by two world wars,  by the trans- 
formation of empires, by technological advances that have revolutionized 
transport  and communications. It is,  in  fact, difficult for  the  younger  genera- 
tion to  appreciate  the  problems  that  confronted  Scott  and  Amundsen. 
Yet,  with  another  great adventure before  us, it is fitting  to look back, 
both admiringly  and  critically, on the  rival efforts of five decades ago. There 
are sufficient parallels to  current  preparations  for landing  men on the moon 
to encourage us to assess the  triumph  and  tragedy  that  occurred in the  ant- 
arctic summer of 1911-12. 
It is often pointed out,  particularly  in  Britain,  that  Scott  and  his  men 
made  great sacrifices to carry  out a  thorough scientific program. Thus, on 
the grim  march  back,  as  they  started down the magnificent highway of the 
Beardmore Glacier, Scott recorded in his diary (February 8, 1912): 
“. . . I decided  to  camp  and  spend the rest of the day  geologising. It has 
been  extremely  interesting. We found  ourselves  under  perpendicular cliffs of 
Beacon sandstone, weathering rapidly and carrying veritable coal seams. 
From the last Wilson, with his sharp eyes,  has  picked  several  plant  impres- 
sions, the last a piece of coal with beautifully traced leaves in layers, also 
some  excellently  preserved  impressions of thick  stems,  showing  cellular 
structure. In one  place  we  saw the cast of small  waves in the sand . . .” 
When, six weeks later, they camped, exhausted and half starved, at 
what became their last resting place on the Ross Ice Shelf, only 11 miles 
short of ample food, they had 35 pounds of rock specimens on the sledge 
that  they  had  dragged  the final agonizing miles. 
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There  is no  doubt  that the fast-moving Norwegians were less interested 
in specimen-collecting. There  was  no  one  in Amundsen’s party comparable 
to Dr. Edward A. Wilson - that  remarkably gifted companion of Scott who 
served  not  only  as  a  physician,  but  as  a  competent  ornithologist, geologist, 
and  student of nature,  as well as a fine painter.  Amundsen  and his men  did 
bring  back  rock  specimens  from  Mount  Betty,  near the foot of Axel  Heiberg 
Glacier,  but being all  granites  the samples  did  not carry the tale of Antarc- 
tica’s temperate  past  that  lay  in Wilson’s coal samples. 
Nevertheless, it seems  unlikely  that  the scientific work of the  Britons 
played  a decisive role  in  their downfall. The  causes of the  disaster  have  been 
much discussed and  many  contributing  factors cited. For example: 
(1) The loss of ponies beforehand limited the supplies that could be 
hauled to the depots. Of 19 ponies brought south to aid in laying depots on 
the Ross Ice  Shelf (traversed during the first  and  final quarters of the trek) 
nine were lost before the journey began. 
(2) Had  One-Ton  Depot  been  placed at latitude 80” S., as planned,  Scott 
and his two surviving companions could have reached it on their return 
march. Instead, because of the weakness of the ponies,  it  was  placed  some 31 
miles short of there. Scott’s party died only 11 miles away. 
(3) The last-minute addition of Lieutenant Henry R. Bowers  to the 
planned  four-man pole party may  have strained the rationing plans. 
(4) The rations appear to have been vitamin-deficient. The party was 
so weak, even before reaching the Pole, that Scott wrote before the return 
march, “I wonder if we can do it?” 
(5) The tins of cooking fuel cached along the return route were found 
to be partly empty,  which  forced the men  to eat frozen  food.  Apparently the 
heat of the sun had vaporized part of the fuel, enabling it to escape past 
the corks. 
(6) The  weather on the return march  seems  to  have  been unusually bad. 
Scott  wrote,  in  his  final  “Message  to the Public”: “. . . our wreck is certainly 
due to this sudden advent of severe weather. . . .” 
(7) The complexity of the transportation plan made it vulnerable. It 
depended  in part on  motor-sledges,  ponies,  and  dogs.  However, three quarters 
of the distance  was to be covered by man-hauling. 
It was  this  last  factor  that  probably  was decisive. Man is a poor beast 
of burden, as was  shown in the  terrible  experience of Scott,  Shackleton,  and 
Wilson in  their  thrust to the  south of 1902-3. However,  Scott  relied chiefly 
on man-hauling in 1911-12 because ponies could  not  ascend the glacier mid- 
way to the Pole. The Norwegians correctly guessed that dog teams could 
go all the way. Furthermore,  they used  a  simple  plan,  based on their  native 
skill with skis and  on dog-driving methods that  were tried and  true. The 
moon will be  reached  by  burning  up  a succession of rocket  stages  and  casting 
them off. This, in effect, is what the Norwegians did with their dogs, the 
weaker animals being sacrificed to feed the other animals and the men 
themselves. 
Such a procedure was distasteful to the British, although they were 
willing to eat ponies. These were introduced to Antarctica in 1908 by 
Shackleton, who had seen the hardy little animals in action on a visit to 
Shanghai  and  had  heard of their  resistance  to cold during  the Russo-Japa- 
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nese  War of 1904-5. “I placed little  reliance on dogs”, Shackleton  wrote, and 
Scott’s attitude was  similar.  Both  men  used transport methods whose effi- 
ciency, under polar conditions, was uncertain.  Shackleton  brought an auto- 
mobile and  Scott  had  with  him  three motor-sledges specially built  for  the 
expedition. None of the motor-sledges got more than 40 miles from Scott’s 
base at  Hut Point,  and  it  was not until a  generation later  that mechanized 
vehicles reached a level of development and reliability that made them 
suitable  for  polar  transport. 
Both  Scott  and  Shackleton  were  innovators  and  made significant con- 
tributions to the technology of polar exploration, but by innovating they 
forfeited reliability. Later their countrymen made skillful use of dogs in 
both  polar regions and  drove  the  tractors  that  first crossed Antarctica. 
It is sometimes said that, had Scott had the good sense to  turn back 
when he saw the  danger signs - as Shackleton had done - he could have 
saved  his  party, but  this overlooks the heavy burden of national  pride that 
Scott carried on his shoulders, particularly after learning that the Nor- 
wegians were striving for the same goal. 
The  heroic  manner in which the  Britons  met  their  fate,  as  recorded  in 
Scott’s diary, has inspired men ever since. Their tragedy is almost better 
known than Amundsen’s success. Nothing quite  like it has  ever  recurred, 
for  never  again is it likely that men will set  forth on foot into  the  unknown, 
cutting themselves off so completely from their fellows. Even when our 
astronauts are  far  out  in space, their bodily functions are monitored  on earth. 
When  signals  from  Scott  Carpenter’s  capsule  indicated it was overheating, 
he was told from  the  ground  to  drink  more  water.  What  a  contrast  to  the 
Britons,  freezing in  utter isolation, although  9  days  earlier  potential  rescuers 
had been only 11 miles away. 
The  southernmost  point  in  the world is  today the  site of the US. Amund- 
sen-Scott South Pole Station, where moving pictures are shown almost 
nightly and a local post office displays the “wanted” posters typical of a 
more cosmopolitan environment. Congressmen, elderly veterans of Scott’s 
expeditions  and  journalists  reach the  Pole  with no more  exertion  than climb- 
ing an aircraft gangway. 
Scientific observations, the raison $&re of the  station,  are  carried  out 
extensively, throwing new light on the earth’s magnetism, the role of the 
Van Allen  radiation  belts in producing auroras,  and  the effect of Antarctica 
on world  weather.  Because pack ice at  the opposite end of the world is un- 
substantial and constantly on the move, the South Pole is the one place 
where  earth satellites  in  north-south  orbits  can be monitored  on  each trip 
around  the world. Such polar  orbits are  the most desirable for communica- 
tions and  for  weather  observations,  since  they cross all  latitudes. Monitoring 
equipment  already  has  been  used  experimentally at  the  South  Pole  and  the 
role of that  station  as a  space  observatory  may  increase. 
Because of the twelve-nation treaty opening Antarctica  to  research  by 
all  nations and closing it to  military  activity,  the  South  Pole  has also become 
a symbol of international co-operation in  the cause of science. Terrestrial 
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claims have been, in effect, shelved and researchers have left  their political 
differences behind. Here again the implications, in so far as the moon is con- 
cerned, are obvious. 
At first glance there seems little  in common between the  astronauts of 
today and the brave Englishmen who carried the pride of a great empire 
to  the Polar  Plateau half a  century ago. The Soviet and American astronauts 
may appear to have more in common with the dashing Norwegians who 
rode, exuberant, behind their dogs. 
Actually, the astronauts are pioneers of a different age. They talk of 
burnout, re-entry, and drogues, as opposed to hoosh, crampons, and cre- 
vasses. Although stamina, ability to navigate, and bravery are still basic 
criteria, a remarkable technological aptitude has become essential. 
Nevertheless, fundamental considerations that controlled the outcome 
in 1911-12 still apply. It may be the  party  with  the  least elaborate plan and 
the most reliable transport  that gets there first, whereas those with the more 
ambitious scheme may bring home the scientific  prizes. 
Scott’s polar party on the trail. 
